We investigate why incumbents win disproportionately often. To do so, we structurally estimate the parameters of a dynamic model of voter behavior using U.S. Senate data. Our model specifies three potential reasons for the incumbency advantage: selection, tenure and challenger quality. Each of these separate effects is identified from data on histories of election outcomes. We estimate the parameters of the model using the method of maximum likelihood. We find that tenure effects are negative or small. The incumbency advantage is due to the average quality of incumbents being higher and to incumbents facing weaker challengers than candidates running for open seats.
drawn, the only change in the utility flow from a candidate over his career is his tenure effect, which moves in an identical way across elected officials. An incumbent leaves the Senate with an exogenous exit probability that depends on tenure. As such, we do not account for the selection bias that may result from senators choosing when to retire based on their electoral prospects; we view this as reasonable in the vast majority of cases.
We estimate the parameters of our model using U.S. Senate data. The use of Senate data avoids several pitfalls present in other data sources. In particular, the U.S. House of Representatives contains many instances of redistricting and it is not clear how to treat elections following a redistricting, when two incumbents may run against each other.
Our dataset contains the history of senatorial seats, recording how candidates came to office, how long they served in office and the reason that they left office. Conditional on a given vector of fundamental parameters, the solution to the voter's dynamic choice problem implies a probability distribution over the possible electoral histories of a senatorial seat.
We derive this distribution, and use it to estimate the parameters of the model with the method of maximum likelihood.
The model allows us to separately identify selection and tenure effects in a relatively intuitive way. The key feature of the data that allows identification is that two senators with identical tenure could have important differences in their electoral history and the winning probability of an incumbent depends on the entire history of the seat. For instance, a one-term incumbent could have beaten a two-term incumbent, or he could have beaten a five-term incumbent. If five-term incumbents almost never lose, then the econometrician's posterior distribution of permanent quality for the one-term incumbent who beats a fiveterm incumbent will be different from the posterior distribution for a one-term incumbent who beat a two-term incumbent. If selection based on candidate quality is an important determinant of the incumbency advantage, then these two incumbents would have quite different probabilities of reelection despite their identical tenure. Thus, the importance of selection will be identified based on how the electoral history affects reelection probabilities, conditioning on incumbent tenure.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to estimate the role of selection in the incumbency advantage using an approach that is consistent with an optimizing model of voter choice and the first to consider the entire history of a seat in evaluating the role of selection.
However, our approach is very parsimonious. For instance, we do not use the characteristics of candidates and elections, which have been used in other studies. We make this choice for two reasons. First, including additional characteristics would not be feasible within the context of a dynamic optimization model as these characteristics would be state variables.
Second, we view the spirit of our study as providing evidence on the importance of selection compared to a mixture of all other effects, and not in providing a detailed account of the relative contribution of different factors to the advantage of incumbents.
Our results show that tenure effects are negative or small. Thus, there are two factors that explain the incumbency advantage. First, on average, incumbents are of higher quality due to selection effects. Second, on average, incumbents face a weaker pool of challengers than do candidates running for an open seat.
We performed several robustness checks of our model. Principally, we examined a variety of relevant moments for which the parameters are not explicitly chosen to fit. These moments appear to fit the data reasonably well at the estimated parameter values. For instance, the predicted incumbency advantage from the model is in line with the data. In addition, the winning probabilities as a function of tenure and the number of terms since the last open seat are close to the data. The model is capable of generating these high winning probabilities for incumbents without large tenure effects, demonstrating that selection effects are a big part of the story.
Relationship with the existing literature
Starting in the 1970s, a vast literature has tried to quantify incumbency advantages. 1 Early studies regressed the winning probability on an incumbency dummy. As we discussed above, interpreting a positive coefficient in this regression as a tenure effect is problematic because it may be due to a selection effect. The first method to try to separate the tenure and selection effects defined the tenure effect as the difference between the vote share that a senator earned in his second and first elections. This measure became known as the sophomore surge. 2 Gelman and King (1990) pointed out that the sophomore surge approach also suffers from selection bias because a candidate who is elected would disproportionately have had a good draw in his first election, that may be idiosyncratic to the first election.
1 Most studies use House election data, which contains a larger number of elections. They typically regress winning probabilities on a set of regressors. See the references in the surveys by Cover and Mayhew (1977) , Fiorina (1989) , and Mayhew (1974) . For more recent studies, see also Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002) , Cox and Katz (1996) , and Lee (2001) , together with the other references cited in this section.
2 See Erikson (1971), Cover (1977) , Gelman and King (1990) and references therein.
They developed a reduced-form OLS method that helps mitigate this selection bias. Levitt and Wolfram (1997) apply a Heckman-style correction to the sophomore surge to further mitigate the Gelman and King (1990) selection bias. Separately, Levitt and Wolfram (1997) attempt to separate the sources of incumbency advantage into increased incumbent quality and decreased challenger quality, by considering pairs of elections where the same two candidates face each other.
Our paper builds on these earlier papers, in that we recognize, and attempt to control for, the problem of selection bias that is inherent in an electoral system. Our model incorporates the fact that an incumbent who won had a positive idiosyncratic shock in the first period, as in Gelman and King (1990) . The idiosyncratic shock occurs because the winner of an open election likely faced a competitor whose quality was less than the population average, but will face an average competitor in his second election. As in Levitt and Wolfram (1997) ,
we allow the new candidate density to differ based on whether the candidate is in an open seat election or not, in some specifications.
Our approach differs from the approach of these papers in several important ways. First, we estimate parameters that are fully consistent with an optimizing model of voter behavior.
Thus, there are no longer any questions as to whether our estimates suffer from selection bias, conditional on our model being accurate. Second, our model is identified by the entire history of electoral outcomes since the open seat election, and not just by the data from the current election. 3 This allows us to identify our parameters of interest, without using the limited (and potentially biased) information available from when pairs of candidates face each other multiple times. Third, our model generalizes the sophomore surge approach, in that it allows for tenure effects, which we can estimate separately from the effect of selection, by using the entire history of outcomes. Fourth, we use data from the U.S. Senate, and not the U.S. House of Representatives. This allows us to avoid having to deal with the problems inherent in redistricting. 4 Fifth, do not include many of the covariates used in earlier studies. We made this choice because we need to keep the number of state variables to a minimum in order to estimate the dynamic model. Finally, we use data only on election wins, and not on vote shares. We made this decision in order to estimate parameters that are consistent with a well-specified model and because vote shares are more likely to be 3 In this way, our model relates to Samuelson (1987) , who first recognized the importance of the entire history of a seat in evaluating incumbency advantage. 4 Redistricting is problematic because it is difficult to define incumbency and electoral outcomes in the case where one district is formed from parts of more than one district.
biased by endogenous challenger quality, which we do not model. 
The Model
We model the decision problem for a representative voter who values services from an elected official, in our case a senator. The valuation has two components: a senator-specific, permanent quality q and a tenure effect τ m common to all senators of tenure m. The quality q is an element of a compact set Q. Tenure is defined by the number of completed terms in office. The utility flow for the voter in a given period is additive in these two components,
i.e.
The voter values the expected sum of current and future utility flows, discounted by β.
In each period, voters choose between two candidates in an election. There are two kinds of elections between which it is useful to distinguish. One is an incumbent-challenger election. This is an election where an incumbent runs against a challenger. The other type
is called an open seat election, which takes place in situations where neither candidate is an incumbent. This happens when incumbents leave office for reasons other than losing an election. We assume that these reasons are exogenous and depend only on tenure.
The timing is as follows. At the beginning of the period, the incumbent either exits or runs for reelection. Denote the probability of exit at tenure m by δ m . If he exits, two new candidates run for the seat. If he runs for reelection, a single challenger runs against the incumbent. Each new candidate then draws his permanent quality q from an atomless distribution F (q) 5 with corresponding density f (q). In the estimation, we allow 5 We assume that F is atomless to ensure that the voter has strict preferences over candidates with probability one. For an open seat election, the optimal choice of the voter is simple: choose the candidate with the higher q. The utility flows generated by the candidates are otherwise identical.
In an incumbent-challenger election the decision is more complicated. We express the problem recursively using a Bellman equation. Denote by q the quality of the incumbent and by q c the quality of the challenger. The state vector is the incumbent senator's quality q and tenure m. Let V (q, m) denote the expected discounted utility for the voter at the beginning of the period, before either exit occurs or new candidates appear. Let W denote the expected discounted utility from an open seat. Then
If the incumbent chooses to run again (with probability 1 − δ m ), the voter chooses between the incumbent and a challenger. The integral in the first term in (2) reflects the expected utility in this case, which involves integrating over q c .
If the incumbent exits, the voter obtains W. Letting the two challengers' qualities be defined by q and q c ,
The value of the open seat reflects the fact that two challengers are drawn and the higher q is retained.
Denote by r(q, q c , m) the optimal reelection rule of a voter when the incumbent has quality q and tenure m and the challenger has quality q c ; r(q, q c , m) = 1 denotes reelection and r(q, q c , m) = 0 denotes choosing the challenger. We now show that the solution to the decision problem can be characterized as a cutoff rule. As a result, the Bellman equation takes a simple form that is useful in computing the solution. We start by characterizing the decision rule.
Lemma 1 r(q, q c , m) is weakly decreasing in q c .
The proof is in the appendix. The lemma implies that the voter follows a cutoff rule:
challengers are elected only if their quality exceeds a cutoffq(q, m). Note that voters do not simply choose the candidate with the higher q, or even the higher q + τ m , since the voter is forward looking and considers future tenure effects and exit probabilities.
The cutoff rule allows us to express the Bellman equation more concisely. We do this by defining V (q, 0) to be the voter's value function from an open seat election where the one candidate has drawn q and a second candidate's quality has yet to be drawn. Then, by letting δ 0 = 0, equation (2) can be rewritten as
If the incumbent does not exit (the case given in 4a), the expected return has two components: first, the payoff when the incumbent is retained, times the probability of retention F (q); second, the expected value of the challenger, conditional on his quality being abovē q. If the incumbent exits, δ m W can be rewritten as (4b) by using (4) to define V (x, 0).
Estimation 4.1 Overview
Our goal is to provide inference on the fundamental parameters of our model: the candidate permanent quality density f , the incumbency effects τ m , the exit probabilities δ m , and the discount factor β. Our data contain information on when and how each U.S. senator came to office and when and how he left office. These data allow us to understand, for instance, whether a senator came to office by winning an open election or by defeating an incumbent.
We do not directly observe any component of quality. However, given a vector of fundamental parameters, the model generates a probability distribution over sequences of electoral outcomes. We use the method of maximum likelihood to find the parameter values that maximize the probability of seeing the observed electoral outcomes.
To understand how the model provides evidence on reelection probabilities that we observe in the data, it is useful to consider a special case. Suppose that incumbency effects and exit probabilities are constant across tenure, i.e. τ m =τ and δ m =δ. In this case, the policy function satisfiesq(q, m) = q; the voter always chooses the candidate with the higher q because tenure does not affect current or future payoffs.
Suppose that candidate A won an open seat election in 1960 against candidate B and then defeated challenger C in 1966. After that election, we know that A's permanent quality q is distributed as the maximum of 3 i.i.d. draws from F . Suppose instead that C had won in 1966. Then, we can infer instead that C's permanent quality is distributed as the maximum of 3 i.i.d. draws from F . Thus, the probability of the incumbent winning in 1972 depends solely on the number of elections that have occurred since the last open election for that seat. As a result, the probability of reelection will be increasing in the number of terms since an open seat, and conditionally independent of tenure.
In general, the probability of reelection will depend on the entire history of wins and We now turn to the specifics of our data and our inference procedure.
Data and Institutional Background
We construct our dataset using data on U.S. Senate elections from the Roster of U.S.
Congressional Office Holders (ICPSR 7803). In the original dataset each record refers to a senator seated in a given congress (a two-year period starting in odd-numbered years) and contains information about when and why the senator was seated, and when and why he left congress. The ICPSR dataset ends in 1998. We compiled more recent data in order to extend this dataset up to the 2002 election. 6 We use these data to construct records of histories from an open election to an exit. We We treat the primary and election as a single election with two candidates.
We treat all elections, whether special or regular, as counting for one term. This simplification is imperfect because the time period in our model is one term. For instance, the voter discounts the future identically if there are four years between elections (due to a special election) or if there are six years between elections. Moreover, the interpretation of the tenure effects is that they depend on number of elections won rather than number of years served. elections. Only 8 senators served more than 6 terms. To avoid estimating parameters with very few observations, we assume that τ m = τ 6 and δ m = δ 6 for all m ≥ 6. 7 We observe cases where a senator loses an election and then retires between the election and the end of his term. We ignore the retirement decision in these cases. 8 U.S. Constitutional Amendment XVII. 9 19 senators served non-contiguous terms.
Inference and Likelihood
As is well known in the literature, it is difficult to estimate the discount factor of a dynamic discrete choice problem (see Rust, 1987, and Magnac and Thesmar, 2002) . Given that a regular term lasts six years, we set β = 0.96 6 . In principle, we could jointly estimate all of the other parameters. However, since we treat the retirement probability as exogenous,
we can obtain consistent estimates of the retirement probabilities δ m without solving the voter's decision problem. Specifically, we estimate δ m as the number of senators that retire with tenure m divided by the total number of senators that held office for at least m terms.
We allow the quality distribution of new candidates to vary depending on the type of elections. Specifically, we assume that candidates in an open seat election draw permanent quality q from a distribution F o , whereas challengers of incumbents draw their permanent quality from a distribution F c . We assume that both distributions are normal with means One of the tenure effect parameters, without loss of generality τ o , is not identified:
adding a constant to τ 0 and the same constant to τ 1 , ...τ 6 would yield the same predictions.
Therefore, we set τ 0 = 0.
We now discuss the estimation of the other parameters. Consider first the contribution to the likelihood of chain d of dimension T . Denote the history of wins and losses prior to the t th election in the chain with the vector h t ≡ d 1 , ...d t−1 . 11 Denote the posterior density over incumbent quality after history h t as g(·|h t ), and the number of terms served by the incumbent holding office after history h t as m ht . Define e t as the random variable that indicates the outcome of the tth election in the chain, with the interpretation that e t = 1 indicates the incumbent winning the election and e t = 0 indicates the incumbent 10 We estimate a specification where we constrain fo = fc. For this specification, we set µ = 0 and σ = 1 as these parameters are not identified. losing. We can then express the likelihood as:
Pr (e t = d t |h t ) (5)
The expression (5) depends on the policy functionq, which in turn depends on the parameters. The expression also depends on the density of permanent quality for the incumbent at the start of period t, g ht . We evaluate this density using Bayes Law and the policy functionq. Call p the "prior" density of the incumbent at time t and decompose history h t into two elements: the outcome of last period election d t−1 and the previous history h t−1 . Bayes Law implies
The prior density p is equal to f in the case where the incumbent was a challenger in the previous period, and is defined recursively as equal to g(·|h t−1 ) otherwise.
We now show how this formula is applied to three specific cases. First, consider the density of a one-term incumbent who won an open seat election in the previous period. In this case the prior density is f o , and the conditional probability of winning the open seat given q is F o (q(q, 0)) . For this case, (6) can be written as:
Next, consider the cases with t > 1. We distinguish two cases, depending on whether the incumbent won or lost in the previous election. If d t−1 = 1, then the conditional probability of the election outcome in the previous period is equal to the probability that the challenger draws a permanent quality less than the threshold valueq(q, m h t−1 ), hence:
Finally, if d t−1 = 0, the incumbent was a challenger at t − 1. This means that the prior density is f and that the his permanent quality q is greater than the thresholdq(·) implied by the voters' decision rule, which is a function of the previous incumbent's quality and Table 1 : Exit probabilities by tenure history. Since the previous incumbent quality is distributed according to g(·|h t−1 ), then equation (6) can be written as:
In order to evaluate the log likelihood of our dataset for a given parameter vector, we first compute the policy function using numerical dynamic programming. We then evaluate the likelihood for a chain using the computed policy function, together with (5) and (6), and sum the log of the likelihood for each chain. Details on the numerical procedure used in the estimation are in the appendix. Table 1 shows the exit probabilities (computed directly from the data) that we used in the estimation. Table 2 shows the estimation results. Model 1 refers to the case where all candidates are drawn from the same distribution; in Model 2, we allow for the possibility that open seat candidates draw from a distribution with a different mean from candidates challenging incumbents.
Results
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The bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Recall that the relevant units are that the standard deviation on the distribution of quality is one. The results suggest that any advantage to incumbency is not inherent to the office, but rather the result of the weaker candidates running as challengers against incumbents. The inherent disadvantage of incumbency measured for incumbents in Model 2 is small; for the most common cases, 12 The results reported in this section are still preliminary. We also use the simulated data to evaluate the performance of the model. A simple statistic by which to judge the model is average terms served. In our data, the average terms served by a senator is 1.73. In the base model, it is 1.67, whereas in the Model 2 it is 1.74.
Another useful measure of goodness of fit is to see how well the model reproduces reelection probabilities. Since we are fundamentally interested in differences in reelection probabilities as a function of tenure, consider the following comparison of reelection proba- Table 3 : Goodness of fit: reelection probabilities by tenure bilities, by tenure, in the model and data, displayed in Table 3 .
Note that the model with identical distributions for all challengers, Model 1, underestimates the winning probability of one-term incumbents. One way to interpret this is that there is something special about one-term incumbents that is hard for the model to replicate. open seat, model one underpredicts the winning probability for the incumbent, but model 2 explains it well. One feature that our model cannot explain is the descending values generated by the data for column one.
Discussion and Conclusion
We analyze the causes of incumbency advantage for the U.S. Senate by structurally estimating a dynamic optimizing model of voter behavior. Our results are identified by examining the impact of the entire history of election outcomes following an open election on the probability that an incumbent wins, conditioning on the tenure of the incumbent. We find that the incumbency advantage is due to two effects. Incumbent senators are, on average, selected to be of high quality, due to their past successes in winning elections. In addition, incumbent senators are able to deter high quality challengers. However, we find no evidence of other benefits intrinsic to incumbency: tenure appears to provide a small disadvantage in reelection.
Our result that tenure is not an important determinant of the incumbency stands in contrast to some of the literature. However, studies of incumbency advantage have mostly focused on the U.S. House of Representatives. Relative to the House, the importance of tenure in the Senate may be less, because committee assignments are not as important.
Our result that incumbents face weaker challengers does have precedent in the literature.
For instance, Levitt and Wolfram (1997) find the same effect in House elections, although with a different identification mechanism. Note that the selection effect still implies that incumbent senators are hard to beat, and therefore our finding that potential challengers might be dissuaded from running against incumbents is not puzzling.
There is substantial information available about elections besides the history of a seat that might be relevant, but that we do not use. For example, we could allow the density of permanent quality for a candidate to vary based on his previous career path. In particular,
House experience could affect a candidate's quality by adding to his legislative experience.
However, among senators who had just won an open seat election, those with House experience were reelected 79.8 percent of the time, while the figure was 78 percent for those without House experience. We did not use House experience because it does not appear to be an important predictor of the reelection probability.
In addition, the vast majority of the literature on incumbency effects uses the party of Thus, if anything, there appears to be a small negative effect of past party affiliation. It is conceptually difficult to model a negative correlation in the preference for parties across chains. Thus, we did not use party affiliation.
In spite of the fact that we do not include information on career experience or party affiliation, our estimated model generates conditional reelection probabilities that are close to those in the data. The main objective of this study is not in accounting for the relative contribution of different sources of tenure effects, but rather, in describing the extent to which selection is an important determinant of incumbency advantage. Selection appears to be an important determinant. We hope that future research can further quantify the magnitudes of different sources of selection and tenure effects. Notice that, whenever g is weakly increasing and continuous, so is T (g), so T is an operator, T : C → C. Notice that T meets Blackwell's sufficient conditions for a contraction:
for any function g ≥ g, T (g ) ≥ T (g), and for a constant c, T (g + c) = T (g) + βc, 0 < β < 1.
Hence, by the contraction mapping lemma, for all functions V 0 ∈ C, the sequence defined by V n = G(V n−1 ) converges to a function V ∈ C that is the unique fixed point of the operator T . Since V is the fixed point, it is exactly the value function that solves the dynamic programming problem. Since V ∈ C, the value function V is weakly increasing in the first argument.
Note that q c only shows up in two places in the choice of candidates (once in the current reward to choosing the challenger, once in the future value if the challenger is chosen), and if V is weakly increasing in the first argument, the total discounted reward from choosing the challenger is strictly increasing in q c , while the discounted reward from choosing the incumbent is constant in q c . As a result, r(q, q c , m) must be decreasing in q c for any fixed q and m.
A.2 Details on the numerical computation
The permanent quality distribution F is continuous, which implies that we need to approximate the value function in our computation. We choose a discrete grid approximation, and use 301 evenly spaced grid points between −6 and +6, in order to capture the tails of the standard normal density. We use linear interpolation in order to create a smooth policy functionq, necessary for an efficient search for the maximum likelihood parameters.
We find the parameter vector that maximizes the likelihood by using numerical search algorithms. We use two different algorithms: a routine that we developed that combines the simplex method with random jumps and the method of simulated annealing by Goffe,
Ferrier and Rogers, (1992).
We compute standard errors and confidence intervals using a bootstrap method. To perform the bootstrap, we resample from the data with replacement, in order to create a dataset with the same number of chains as our original dataset. We then evaluate the maximum likelihood parameter estimates with the new dataset. We repeat this procedure 20 times in order to find a density of the parameter estimates, which we use to derive the standard errors and confidence intervals.
